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Essays
REDEFINING STATE POWER AND
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE WAR ON
TERRORISM
Jonathan Hafetz*
I. INTRODUCTION
America’s “war on terrorism” initiated after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks has served more than a rhetorical function.1 It reflects
the U.S. government’s considered legal position that it is engaged in an
armed conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated groups—a
conflict of unbounded territorial scope and uncertain, if not perpetual,
duration. The United States’ adoption of a war paradigm as a central
part of its counter-terrorism policy has had significant consequences.
Among the most important has been the expansion of state power at the
expense of individual liberties.
This Essay explores the impact of the war on terror on the detention
and treatment of terrorism suspects. Part I describes the shift in U.S.
policy after the 9/11 attacks and the legal underpinnings of the war on
terrorism. Part II examines how a war paradigm underlies key aspects of
the United States’ approach to terrorism, including: (1) indefinite
detention; (2) the use of military commissions rather than regular
criminal courts; and (3) the rendition of terrorism suspects. Part III
explores the ways in which the war on terrorism has become
institutionalized, and the consequences for the state, society, and
individual rights.

Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I would like to
thank Michael Mulanaphy for his research assistance and the editorial staff of the Valparaiso
University Law Review.
1
This Essay will use the phrase “war on terrorism” to describe the United States’ armed
conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. Although the Obama
administration has refrained from using this phrase, it has maintained that the United
States is engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups and
continued many “war on terrorism” policies.
*
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II. THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Vice President Dick Cheney has said that “9/11 changed
everything.”2 But it was the decisions made after the 9/11 attacks that
had the most far-reaching impact on U.S. counter-terrorism policy. The
shift in the United States’ approach to terrorism was immediate. On
September 18, 2001, President Bush signed into law a joint congressional
resolution authorizing him “to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons” responsible for the 9/11
attacks as well as those who “harbored” them.3 Addressing the nation
two days later, President Bush framed the fight in terms of an
apocalyptic armed struggle. “Americans,” he said, “should not expect
one battle but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have seen.”4 This
new war, President Bush suggested, would not be fought against another
country, or necessarily on battlefields, but instead would be waged
across the globe against a transnational terrorist organization and its
affiliates.
President Bush’s framework sought to galvanize the country and to
signal that the United States would use all of its power and resources to
fight terrorism. It also, however, indicated an important change in U.S.
policy, away from treating terrorism through a law enforcement model
and towards the adoption of a military-based approach. In the following
months, the precise contours of this new kind of war—the war on
terror—would be defined through a series of executive-branch
memoranda and decisions.
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an order calling for
the establishment of military commissions to try prisoners for war
crimes.5 The United States had not used military commissions since
World War II, and its past use of these ad hoc tribunals had been
criticized for denying defendants due process and implementing a form
of victor’s justice.6 President Bush’s order nevertheless swept broadly,
Meet the Press: Dick Cheney (NBC television broadcast Sept. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244/ns/meet_the_press/t/transcript-sept/
(transcript).
3
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
4
Frank Pellegini, The Bush Speech: How to Rally a Nation, TIME U.S. (Sept. 21, 2001),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,175757,00.html.
5
Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831, 57,831–36 (Nov. 16, 2001),
reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 25–28 (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
6
See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND
AMERICAN LAW (2003); Alan W. Clarke, De-Cloaking Torture: Boumediene and the Military
Commissions Act, 11 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 59, 86 n.115 (2009)
2
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authorizing the commissions to prosecute any foreign national the
President had “reason to believe . . . was a member of . . . al Qa[e]da” or
had “engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit” a terrorist
act.7
In addition, the administration began describing prisoners as
“enemy combatants,” claiming that the government could detain them
indefinitely without charge instead of prosecuting them. In war, the
administration argued, enemy combatant detentions were routine and
well-accepted. A substantial number of prisoners detained after 9/11,
however, bore little, if any, resemblance to any established definition or
traditional understanding of a “combatant.” The prisoners included
individuals who were not members of an enemy government’s armed
forces, had not been on a battlefield, and had not taken part in hostilities
against the United States or its allies. Some prisoners were seized
outside areas of armed conflict altogether, in places such as Bosnia or
The Gambia.8
Intelligence-gathering was a central, if not the primary, goal of the
detentions. As Vice President Dick Cheney explained after the 9/11
attacks, the United States planned to “work . . . the dark side,” doing
things “quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that
are available to our intelligence agencies.”9 In a series of memoranda,
the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel sanctioned various
“enhanced interrogation techniques” that bordered on, and in some
cases amounted to, torture, including water-boarding, cold cell, and
prolonged sleep deprivation.10 War helped to supply a justification for
these techniques, which the Bush administration grounded in the
President’s power as commander-in-chief under Article II of the
Constitution—a power that the authors of the Torture Memos claimed
was without restriction—notwithstanding the Geneva Conventions, the

Military Order of November 13, 2001, supra note 5, § 2(a).
Gabor Rona, An Appraisal of US Practice Relating to ‘Enemy Combatants,’ 10 Y.B. INT’L
HUMANITARIAN L. 232 (2007).
9
Meet the Press: Dick Cheney (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2001), available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14720480/ns/meet_the_press/t/transcript-sept/
(transcript).
10
David Cole, Torture Memos: The Case Against the Lawyers, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 8,
2009, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/oct/08/the-torture-memos-thecase-against-the-lawyers/; William Ranney Levi, Note, Interrogation’s Law, 118 YALE L.J.
1434, 1434 (2009). But see id. at 1439 (arguing that U.S. interrogation policy allowed the
flexibility to engage in highly coercive interrogation practices long before 9/11).
7
8
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Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, and a federal statute criminalizing torture.11
These policies were not devised in a vacuum, but were designed to
facilitate the detention and interrogation of individuals in U.S. custody.
By January 2002, the United States had already started bringing
prisoners to its naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; that facility would
ultimately hold 779 men (171 remain there today).12 In addition, the
United States detained prisoners at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan
(where it currently holds approximately 1800 prisoners),13 as well as at
secret overseas CIA jails, known as “black sites.”14 The United States
also rendered prisoners to foreign governments for torture. Together,
these practices helped create a new U.S.-run global detention system.15
The war on terror provided the overarching framework for this
system. This war, moreover, was defined in such a way to render
inapplicable international humanitarian law or other legal constraints.
The Bush administration, for example, maintained that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda or Taliban members, arguing that
prisoners in the war on terror were not protected even by Common
Article 3.16 Article 3 applies in non-international armed conflicts (i.e.,
conflicts not between two nation states) and prohibits torture, cruel
treatment, and outrages on personal dignity as well as “the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial

11
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra
note 5, at 172.
12
See Andy Worthington, GUANTÁNAMO: THE DEFINITIVE PRISONER LIST (PART I),
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/guantanamo-the-definitive-prisoner-list-part-1/ (last
updated May 2011).
13
See Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Review Board Decides Fates at Afghan Jail; Rights Groups Say
Release Hearings at U.S. Facility Don’t Afford Proper Counsel, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2011, at A3
(placing the number of detainees at 1800).
14
See, e.g., Associated Press, Secret CIA Prison in Romania Exposed:
Report,
NYDAILYNEWS.COM, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-12-08/news/30492622_1_ciaprison-secret-cia-detainees (using this term to describe a recently discovered CIA facility in
Romania).
15
See JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S NEW
GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM (2011).
16
Memorandum from President George W. Bush on Humane Treatment of al Qaeda
and Taliban Detainees to the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the
Attorney General, and Other Officials (Feb. 7, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 5,
at 134–35.
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guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.”17
Defining terrorism as a “new kind of war” not only facilitated the
creation of Guantánamo and other prisons outside the law.18 It also
paved the way for far-reaching changes in the United States’ approach to
the detention, trial, and treatment of prisoners in its custody.
III. U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY IN THE WAR ON TERROR
The language and logic of war has played a pivotal role in the
United States’ confinement of prisoners at Guantánamo and elsewhere.
Not only did war provide a new nomenclature—the “enemy
combatant”—to exempt terrorism suspects from the ordinary criminal
process and trial, but it also supplied the rationale for a new form of
detention.19 War, by its nature, justifies indefinite confinement. As the
Supreme Court explained in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the detention of enemy
fighters to prevent their “return to the battlefield is a fundamental [and
accepted] incident of waging war.”20 In the war on terror, however,
these detentions are of both unlimited geographic and temporal scope:
The conflict’s battlefield is global and its duration is long and uncertain.
Although in Hamdi the Supreme Court cautioned against expanding the
President’s military detention authority beyond the traditional
understandings of armed conflict,21 it did not limit that authority, and it
accepted “enemy combatant” as a valid legal category. After Hamdi, the
government continued to apply Hamdi’s logic to authorize detention
beyond the battlefield in Afghanistan, and lower courts largely

17
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138.
18
See generally Donald H. Rumsfeld, A New Kind of War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/opinion/27RUMS.html (using the phrase “new
kind of war” to describe the operation against terrorist networks).
19
Under the Obama administration, the term “unprivileged enemy belligerent” was
substituted for “enemy combatant.” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010, § 948a(7), Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2575. The change, however, was mainly
cosmetic and did not significantly affect the underlying scope or nature of the military
detention power asserted. See Respondents’ Mem. Regarding the Scope of the Govt’s
Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantánamo Bay, In re Guantánamo Bay
Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442, filed Mar. 13, 2009 (D.D.C.) (TFH) (“Gov’ts Detention
Authority Br.”), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-detauth.pdf (discussing the government’s detention power under the 2001 Authorization for
Use of Military Force).
20
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion).
21
Id. at 521 (“If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of
the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, [the] understanding [that the
AUMF authorizes detention for the duration of hostilities] may unravel.”).
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acquiesced in the government’s expansive claims of detention
authority.22 Over time, the notion of a global armed conflict against al
Qaeda and associated terrorist organizations took root, gaining
acceptance among judges, lawmakers, and the public.
War has also provided a basis for limiting court review of detention
operations. The United States has staunchly resisted federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction over war-on-terrorism-detentions, citing the risks and
difficulties posed by judicial review of military operations and
interference with intelligence-gathering. While the Supreme Court
ultimately upheld federal habeas jurisdiction over the petitions of
Guantánamo detainees,23 it established a multi-factor test for
determining the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution’s Suspension
Clause that requires courts to consider the burdens on the government
before finding an entitlement to habeas corpus.24 Following Boumediene,
the D.C. Circuit rejected extending federal habeas jurisdiction to the
United States’ detentions at Bagram to avoid interfering with military
operations there.25 Further, even regarding Guantánamo, the D.C.
Circuit has narrowly construed the detainees’ habeas rights—out of
concern with interfering with military and counter-terrorism operations.
In reviewing detainee habeas cases, the circuit has: (1) affirmed the
continuing need for broad executive detention power in the armed
conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces;26 (2) analyzed
the government’s allegations with deference and under lax evidentiary
rules to accommodate the demands of the military and intelligence
agencies;27 and (3) precluded judges from granting effective relief to
prisoners whose detentions are found by courts to be invalid.28
The D.C. Circuit’s recent ruling in Latif v. Obama illustrates this
approach.29 In Latif, the appellate panel ruled that district judges must
presume the accuracy of government intelligence reports unless rebutted
by the petitioner. While the presumption purportedly applies only to the
accuracy of what a report describes (e.g., that the detainee, in fact, made
the particular statement to the interrogator), and not to the underlying

22
See Jonathan Hafetz, Calling the Government to Account: Habeas Corpus after
Boumediene, 57 WAYNE L. REV. (forthcoming); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit
after Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451 (2011) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit
narrowly applied Boumediene).
23
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008).
24
Id. at 766.
25
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
26
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
27
Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
28
Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046, 1050–51 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
29
Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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truth of the information itself, that distinction makes little difference in
practice. Under Latif, judges are unable to critically examine intelligence
reports prepared by the government amid the fog of war, despite the fact
that they often consist of multiple levels of hearsay and despite past
findings by district judges of their unreliability. And a single such
report—without any corroborating evidence—is sufficient to justify a
prisoner’s continued detention. As Circuit Judge David Tatel noted in
dissent, the ruling “comes perilously close to suggesting that whatever
the government says must be treated as true.”30 With this ruling, he
explained, “it is hard to see what is left of the Supreme Court’s command
in Boumediene that habeas review be ‘meaningful.’”31
The war paradigm has also made possible the development of a
system of military commissions as an alternative forum to federal courts
for trying terrorism suspects. Military commissions rest on the premise
that members or supporters of al Qaeda and associated groups are
subject to prosecution for a range of offenses under the laws of war by
virtue of their membership in, or support of, terrorist organizations.
Congress has twice legislated various offenses triable by military
commissions.32 Some of these offenses, such as murder in violation of
the law of war,33 rest solely on the defendant’s status as an “unlawful
enemy combatant” (or “unprivileged enemy belligerent” under current
terminology).34 This offense is based on the theory that any harm caused
by unprivileged belligerents violates the laws and customs of war.35 This
theory, however, lacks support under international law, and exposes any
person who fights against the United States or its coalition partners in
the war on terror to prosecution as a war criminal, even if that person’s
actions—for example, shooting back at U.S. or allied military forces—
would be lawful if committed by a privileged belligerent (i.e., one who
qualifies for prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions).36
Id. at 779 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
32
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1020, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat.
2190; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
33
10 U.S.C.A. § 950t(15) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-89 (excluding P.L. 112-55, 11274, 112-78, and 112-81)).
34
See David W. Glazier, A Court Without Jurisdiction: A Critical Assessment of the Military
Charges Against Omar Khadr 9–11 (Loyola Law Sch. L.A., Legal Studies Paper No. 2010-37,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract=1669946 (explaining
why murder in violation of the law of war, as it has been applied in military commission
prosecutions, is not a violation of the law of armed conflict).
35
See id.; Geoffrey S. Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the Time Come to Offer Combatant
Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 289 (2011).
36
Corn, supra note 35, at 290–91. Unlike privileged belligerents in international armed
conflicts (i.e., conflicts between nation states), “nothing a non-state belligerent can do can
30
31
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Other offenses, such as conspiracy to commit war crimes,37 and material
support for terrorism,38 are generally not recognized as war crimes under
international law.39 The application of prosecution for these offenses to
Guantánamo detainees raises problems not only under international law,
but also under the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause (since they were
not law-of-war violations when committed, and were made so only after
the fact by congressional legislation). Additionally, the prosecution of
military commission defendants for providing material support for
terrorism creates significant jurisdictional overlap with Article III courts,
as that charge is commonly leveled by prosecutors against defendants in
federal criminal cases.40
Framing terrorism as war has not only helped expand the
substantive scope of criminal liability through military commission
jurisdiction, but has also led to a diminishment of safeguards against
wrongful imprisonment. As in the habeas corpus detention cases, the
government has argued that the exigencies and challenges presented by
the war on terrorism warrant laxer evidentiary rules and procedural
protections than those required in regularly established courts, whether
under the federal criminal or military justice systems. In Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,41 the Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument that
those exigencies justified deviating from the rules of military courtsmartial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), including
by allowing the accused’s exclusion from proceedings and denying the
accused access to evidence in certain circumstances.42 Yet, while
ever result in ‘lawful’ belligerent status, [thus] impos[ing] an international legal sanction
without a complimentary international legal reward.” Id. at 291.
37
10 U.S.C.A. § 950t(29).
38
10 U.S.C.A. § 950t(25).
39
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597–98 (2006) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.)
(concluding that conspiracy is not a war crime under the law of war); David Weissbrodt &
Andrea W. Templeton, Fair Trials? The Manual for Military Commissions in Light of Common
Article 3 and Other International Law, 26 LAW & INEQ. 353, 362 n.48 (2008) (noting that
“providing material support for terrorism” is not considered a war crime under
international law).
40
RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING
TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
31–38
(2008), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuitjustice.pdf (discussing prosecutors’ use of the material support for terrorism statute in
federal criminal prosecutions); see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, FACT SHEET: TRYING TERROR
SUSPECTS IN FEDERAL COURTS (2011), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/USLS-Fact-Sheet-Courts.pdf (same).
41
548 U.S. at 620–23.
42
Id. at 622–25 (finding that the military commissions violate article 36(b) of the UCMJ,
which requires “‘uniform[ity] insofar as practicable’” between courts-martial and military
commission rules (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000))); see also David J. R. Frakt, Direct
Participation in Hostilities as a War Crime: America’s Failed Efforts to Change the Law of War, 46
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subsequent legislation has repaired some of their deficiencies, military
commissions still give the government greater latitude to rely on
hearsay, and contain fewer protections against the use of coerced
evidence, than regularly established courts.43 War, in short, has been
invoked to justify the development of a separate adjudicatory system
that lacks the same safeguards as federal criminal courts or military
courts-martial.
In addition, war-based rationales underlay the Bush administration’s
extraordinary rendition of terrorism suspects, who were transferred to
foreign governments or secret CIA-run prisons for torture or other
highly coercive methods of interrogation. Before 9/11, the United States
typically conducted renditions within a law enforcement framework,
bringing terrorism suspects to the United States to face trial or sending
them to foreign governments for legal process there.44 Following 9/11,
however, the United States broke with this rendition to justice model.
Internal bureaucratic constraints were lifted, and terrorism suspects were
transferred across the globe—outside any legal framework and with the
specific purpose of subjecting them to torture or other mistreatment.45
The legal construct of an armed conflict against terrorist groups helped
pave the way for this shift, with its emphasis on unfettered executive
power and its characterization of renditions as mere “wartime transfers”
exempt from any constraints imposed by international human rights and
international humanitarian law.46
IV. INTER-BRANCH ACCEPTANCE OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The war on terror has triggered far-reaching changes that transcend
any one administration. While the military detention of terrorism
suspects is subject to greater legal constraints now than after 9/11, those
VAL. U. L. REV. 729, 736–37 (2012) (describing the Bush administration’s military tribunals
that were invalidated in Hamdan).
43
David W. Glazier, Still a Bad Idea: Military Commissions Under the Obama Administration
(Loyola Law Sch. L.A., Legal Studies Paper No. 2010-32, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1658590; see Joanne Mariner, A First Look at the Military Commissions Act of 2009,
Part Two, FINDLAW (Nov. 30, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20091130.
html.
44
HAFETZ, supra note 15, at 52–53.
45
Although the United States had begun rendering terrorism suspects to foreign
governments during the mid-1990s, after 9/11, the practice expanded significantly,
operated with fewer internal checks, and was no longer tied to the existence of legal
proceedings against the suspect in the receiving country. Id.
46
Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1394–1418 (2006) (examining the legal justifications for
extraordinary rendition).
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detentions have also become institutionalized. The result has been to
significantly expand state power, limit individual rights, and erode
accountability mechanisms. This process of institutionalization is
reflected in the actions of all three branches of the federal government.
Following his inauguration in January 2009, President Obama
ordered the closure of the Guantánamo Bay detention facility within one
year, and criticized the prior administration for abandoning human
rights and constitutional values in the struggle against terrorism.
President Obama’s subsequent failure to close Guantánamo
demonstrates the continued support for the new status quo among
Congress, the practical obstacles to restoring legal safeguards after years
of extrajudicial detention, and the extent to which national security
policy itself has become highly politicized. It also suggests how deeply
the assumptions behind the war on terrorism have become embedded in
public policy and discourse.
Even as he promised to close Guantánamo, eliminate any remaining
secret CIA prisons, and ban torture, President Obama himself endorsed
central policies underlying the war on terrorism. While President
Obama expressed a preference for trying Guantánamo detainees in
federal court, he said that criminal trials were not always feasible, nor
were they required.47 President Obama instead accepted that there
existed a category of individuals too difficult to try, but too dangerous to
release, who could be detained indefinitely under the 2001 Authorization
for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”),48 as informed by the law of war.49
President Obama also endorsed the use of military commissions to try
terrorism suspects, after initially suspending all commission proceedings
for four months.50 Although President Obama acknowledged that the
United States’ prior use of commissions at Guantánamo was flawed, he
believed that military commissions could provide a legitimate alternative
to the federal criminal courts for the prosecution of certain terrorism
suspects.51 The administration thus supported legislation aimed at
reforming commissions and making them a more viable forum for

47
The White House, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 2009)
(National Archives, Washington, D.C.).
48
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
49
Id.
50
William Glaberson, Vowing More Rights for Accused, Obama Retains Tribunal System,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2009, at A1.
51
Id.
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terrorism cases.52
With military detention and prosecution, the
administration has, in short, pursued a policy of tool-maximization and
legitimization:
maintaining the government’s flexibility to treat
terrorism suspects under either a law enforcement or law-of-war
paradigm, while making incremental reforms to make the military
option more credible and sustainable.
Congress, in turn, has sought not only to entrench key war on
terrorism policies, but also to expand them in new ways. It has sought
repeatedly to prevent the closure of Guantánamo. Congress, for
example, has prohibited the transfer of Guantánamo detainees to the
United States for any purpose—whether for release, continued detention,
or criminal prosecution in an Article III court.53 It has also placed
significant restrictions on the President’s ability to transfer Guantánamo
detainees to another country, including to their country of origin.54 It
enacted measures, for example, barring the transfer of any Guantánamo
detainee to a country where there has been a confirmed case of
recidivism by a former Guantánamo detainee who was transferred to
that country55 and requiring a foreign country to provide numerous
guarantees about a transferred detainee’s future conduct.56 Together,
these restrictions helped prevent Guantánamo’s closure.
Recent legislation has not only further embedded war on terrorism
detention practices, but expanded them in new ways. The 2012 National
Defense Authorization Act (“2012 NDAA”) expressly authorizes the
military detention of individuals who were “part of” or who
“substantially supported” al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.57
Although this provision of the 2012 NDAA largely codifies lower-court

52
The Obama administration helped to secure passage of the Military Commissions Act
of 2009, which created additional protections for defendants facing prosecution. See
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat 2190.
53
See, e.g., Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L.
No. 111-383, 124 Stat. 4137.
54
Id. § 1033(c) (prohibiting the transfer of a detainee to his home country or any third
country where any detainee previously transferred to that country engaged in terrorist
activity following his transfer).
55
Id. § 1033(c)(1).
56
Id. § 1033(b) (requiring a foreign country to agree to ensure that a transferred prisoner
will not take action to threaten the United States or its citizens or allies and to share
information about the transferred prisoner with the United States regarding the prisoner or
his associates that could affect the security of the United States or its allies).
57
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong.
§ 1021 (2011). The provision mirrors the detention authority claimed by the Obama
administration. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, § 948a(7) Pub.
L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2575.
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interpretation of the President’s detention authority under the AUMF,58
the legislation contains several new measures, including one mandating
that certain terrorism suspects be subjected to military detention.59
While the President may waive this requirement if he deems it in the
national security interests of the United States,60 the legislation creates
for the first time a default presumption of military custody in counterterrorism operations.
Courts have largely accommodated the military treatment of
terrorism suspects. They have, for example, accepted the analogy
between members of al Qaeda (and associated terrorist groups) and
traditional combatants, who may be detained until the end of the war to
prevent their return to the battlefield. Courts have also accepted the use
of military commissions to try terrorism suspects of war crimes.
Although the Supreme Court invalidated the military commissions
created by President Bush’s November 2001 executive order, it did so on
the basis of those commissions’ failure to adhere to congressional
requirements,61 and invited subsequent legislative action in the field.62
Nor has the Supreme Court elsewhere rejected the government’s
attempt to treat terrorism suspects under a war paradigm. To be sure, in
Rasul and Boumediene, the Court rebuffed the government’s assertion of
unreviewable executive detention overseas and held that Guantánamo
detainees could invoke the federal courts’ habeas corpus jurisdiction to
challenge the lawfulness of their confinement.63 And, in Hamdan, the
Court ruled that all individuals held in connection with the war on
terror, including suspected members of al Qaeda, were entitled, at
minimum, to the protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.64 But none of these decisions challenged the underlying
premise that terrorism suspects could be subjected to military
jurisdiction and detained or tried outside of the federal criminal justice
See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
See H.R. 1540 (mandating military detention of individuals who are part of al Qaeda
or associated forces and who “have participated in the course of planning or carrying out
an attack or attempted attack against the United States or its coalition partners”). The
mandatory military detention provision excludes U.S. citizens. See id.
60
Id.
61
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594–613 (2006) (describing the commissions’
failures to adhere to congressional requirements).
62
Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nothing prevents the President from returning to
Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”).
63
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 799 (2008) (holding that Guantánamo detainees
may seek habeas corpus review under the Constitution’s Suspension Clause); Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483–84 (2004) (holding that Guantánamo detainees may seek habeas
corpus review under the federal habeas corpus statute).
64
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629.
58
59
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system. Furthermore, by providing some constraints on the executive’s
more extreme assertions of power—whether by: (1) insisting on
legislative authorization for military commissions (Hamdan); (2)
providing for habeas corpus review of indefinite law-of-war detention
(Rasul and Boumediene); or (3) affirming the application of baseline
international legal protections against torture and other mistreatment
(Hamdan)—these decisions have paradoxically helped to sustain war on
terrorism detention practices through a process of moderation and
legitimization.
America’s response to new terrorist threats shows how much public
perception and political debate have shifted since 9/11. After Nigerian
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab failed to detonate an explosive bomb
hidden in his underwear while aboard a Northwest Airlines flight bound
for Detroit, he was arrested and charged with attempted murder and use
of a weapon of mass destruction. Politicians and pundits immediately
attacked the Obama administration for prosecuting Abdulmutallab in
federal court rather than in a military commission, even though federal
prosecutors had obtained several hundred convictions in terrorismrelated cases since 9/11, and military commissions had yielded only a
handful, all plagued by controversy.65 Opponents of using Article III
courts to try terrorism suspects argued, for example, that a federal
prosecution would undermine the government’s ability to gain useful
intelligence by preventing the use of harsh interrogation methods and
mandating procedural protections, including that the defendant be
afforded a lawyer.
Nearly a decade of viewing terrorism through the lens of war, rather
than from a law enforcement perspective, has helped to make it possible
to argue that terrorist suspects need not be charged in the regular courts
or afforded the protections given other criminal suspects. It has also
contributed to a climate of fear, in which only tough-sounding solutions
have credibility in the public sphere, and where it is assumed that
individual rights guaranteed under the Constitution must be sacrificed
to protect security. This framing helps explain why, for example, the
federal indictment of Somali terrorism suspect Ahmed Abdulkadir
Warsame—after Warsame’s two-month detention on a U.S. ship in the
Gulf of Aden—prompted attacks against the Obama administration for
failing to prosecute Warsame in a military commission.66 Bringing
Warsame to trial in the United States, rather than sending him to
65
Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Senators Patrick J. Leahy (DVT) and Jeff Sessions (R-AL) (Mar. 26, 2010).
66
See Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, U.S. to Prosecute a Somali Suspect in Civilian Court,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011, at A1.
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Guantánamo, wrote Senators Joseph I. Lieberman and Kelly Ayotte,
limited the government’s ability to obtain intelligence, risked the
disclosure of classified and other sensitive information, and endangered
the country’s safety.67
The United States’ adoption of a war paradigm, moreover, has
facilitated the expansion of other controversial practices, such as targeted
killing, which involves the use of unmanned Predator drones to conduct
deadly attacks against suspected terrorists. Outside of armed conflict, a
state’s authority to use deadly force is limited; domestic and human
rights law require a concrete, specific, and imminent threat of death or
serious physical injury to do so.68 The United States, however, has
utilized the expansive and malleable parameters of the war on terror to
justify the targeted killing of alleged members of al Qaeda and al Qaeda
offshoots in places like Yemen and Somalia, where the existence of
armed conflict and the application of the law of war is uncertain.69 At
the same time, because targeted killing is justified as a wartime measure,
it is more difficult to challenge in the courts given the hesitancy of judges
to interfere with military matters and their historic deference to the
executive in this realm.70
V. CONCLUSION
After the United States announced that it had killed Osama bin
Laden, public officials and commentators were careful to emphasize that
the threat of terrorism remained. In part, this reflected a pragmatic
assessment that al Qaeda transcends any one individual, and that the
danger posed by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups remains significant.
But it also highlighted the contradictions and tensions underlying the
war on terrorism itself. If the war is not over now, will it ever end and, if
so, what will be the metric for answering this question? The withdrawal

Joseph I. Lieberman & Kelly Ayotte, Op-ed, Why We Still Need Guantanamo, WASH.
POST, July 22, 2011, at A17.
68
UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON
EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY OR ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS, PHILIP ALSTON 9–12 (2010), available
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add
6.pdf; Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan,
2004–2009, at 11–25 (Notre Dame Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43, 2010)
(examining the legality of the use of military force against suspected terrorists).
69
See Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders 51 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of
Law Pub. Law & Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-64, 2011) (noting the use of
targeted killing in Yemen and Somalia).
70
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 54 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing on standing and
political question grounds the placement of an American citizen located in Yemen on a
targeted kill list).
67
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of U.S. troops from Afghanistan? A determination by the President that
the terrorist threat has been eliminated?71
As if to pre-empt these questions, lawmakers introduced legislation
reaffirming that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict with al
Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, expressly authorizing the
indefinite detention of individuals who were part of or substantially
supported enemy forces in that conflict, and omitting any nexus to the
9/11 attacks.72 The legislation not only underscores the United States’
commitment to a law-of-war-based approach to the detention and trial of
terrorism suspects, but it also shows the malleability and durability of
this framing mechanism.
Bin Laden’s death should have prompted a re-examination of the
war paradigm. But, instead, it reinforced how deeply—and perhaps
irrevocably—that paradigm has permeated national security institutions,
influenced counter-terrorism policy, and altered public opinion. Put
another way, the last decade’s expansion of government power and
limitations on civil liberties seems less a temporary accommodation of
the exigencies and demands of war than a permanent transformation in
the relationship among the state, society, and the individual.

71
See generally Mary L. Dudziak, Op-Ed, This War Is Not Over Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2012, at A31 (describing the difficulties in determining when a war ends).
72
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong.
§ 1021 (2011); see also Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331, 2012 WL 1721124, at *26–28
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012) (comparing the 2012 NDAA to the 2001 AUMF).
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